Imposing conditions that would have been evidence about optimal behaviour in the EEA

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/4D7pAwQ3by33iiRpq/imposing-conditions-that-would-have-been-evidence-about

Warning: armchair evopsych speculation follows.

Related to: Summer vs Winter Strategies

A couple months ago, I had a large amount of tedious work to do. Whenever I sat down to do it, I would be distracted by other, less mentally straining or more interesting tasks. I decided to try an experiment in disconnecting distraction: I removed everything on my laptop that wasn’t that work, and travelled to a remote rural location. I had no internet access, books, or any other things to keep me occupied. I decided to take further advantage of the precommitment opportunity by not taking enough food for the full trip, so I would be fasting for 2.5 of the trip’s 6 days.

I managed to get a large chunk of the work done, so I count the trip as successful and am planning to repeat it for longer time periods. The most interesting observations I got were the effects it had on my mental state. There were two clear effects.

At the time, I attributed all of the mental effects to setpoint-lowering, commitment/​consistency (seeing yourself as "the type of person that does X"), and placebo. Later, I thought of another explanation: all of the conditions in the experiment, when they were present in the EEA, were symptoms of scarcity of resources. They’re all signs of the environment being generally hard to survive in, or of a lowering of the environment’s carrying capacity, e.g. by a drought or a heatwave.

To review the conditions:

It seems reasonable that the mind would be adapted to function differently in resource-scarce environments than in resource-abundant environments, and I’d guess that evolution would deal with this by creating flexible adaptations activated by immediate circumstances rather than by creating unmalleable fixed adaptations, because there’s gene flow or because environments change or because humans move around.

So it might be useful for us to impose conditions that would have been evidence about optimal behaviour in the EEA, in hopes of causing us to more readily execute those behaviors. I’m not sure how effective this really is; I still think the effects from my experiment were largely from setpoint-lowering and commitment/​consistency.

For the scarcity-versus-abundance spectrum, some thoughts:

Things to think about further:

Comment

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/4D7pAwQ3by33iiRpq/imposing-conditions-that-would-have-been-evidence-about?commentId=JCM6yZH8b7CT9q7xR

Once I decided to undereat while travelling. The result was that for the first month I was in hypomania almost, very excited about things and places. I also slept much less and kept away from easy pleasures. At some point, at the end of the month, this hyper-functional system broke down, and I realized that though I thought I was dancing, in a club, I was actually not taking my feet of the ground. I suspected I might be tired, and went to bed. 17 hours later I woke up. I interpreted that as "I put myself in emergency mode and became more interested and productive, still this nitro didn’t get me the nourishment I needed after a month, so the body gave up and sent a message to the mind (or the medial prefrontal cortex) saying—That was all you had. Give up now, hope for a better crop tomorrow."

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/4D7pAwQ3by33iiRpq/imposing-conditions-that-would-have-been-evidence-about?commentId=rvQoBwoiWurtLgatY

I mostly agree with this. However, this point seems reversed:

In the EEA, both were probably somewhat correlated with interpersonal trust and reciprocal altruism. When there are lots of people, a reputation for backstabbing spreads more rapidly and has more consequences.

When there are more people your chances of meeting the same person again are lower, also this makes it hard to keep track of reputations. To the extent abundance correlates with high interpersonal trust and reciprocal altruism, the causation goes the other way.

Comment

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/4D7pAwQ3by33iiRpq/imposing-conditions-that-would-have-been-evidence-about?commentId=dewLNe89GYbrQic4o

The curve will be particularly complex. When there’s no one. No curve. Very few, then it’s worth to collaborate even when they backstab you. Specially if the environment is super-dangerous. You want to create a story according to which they didn’t betray you at all. Anything, as long as the mutual knowledge is still on the friends side. Bigger numbers: Something close to Dunbar number would probably be where you most need to signal trustworthiness, and from then on, the more there are, the lowest is the cost of free-riding.

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/4D7pAwQ3by33iiRpq/imposing-conditions-that-would-have-been-evidence-about?commentId=zDeCffEPyYwqiMcNm

What does science say?

There’s some evidence that hunger may improve memory. Is this the kind of evidence you’re looking for?

Comment

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/4D7pAwQ3by33iiRpq/imposing-conditions-that-would-have-been-evidence-about?commentId=4yhyQ68mWj8dnr2sy

See also this post.

You learn most quickly immediately after ending a long fast. Your brain thinks you just learned something that saved it from starvation.

Comment

I have lowered my prior for these kinds of explanations being correct; maybe it’s the sudden surge of nutrients that does something to the memory? Who knows, but it reads like evopsych-inspired version of the narrative fallacy. If it works empirically, great, if it doesn’t I’m not going to ask "why did my brain not react as if being saved from starvation"?

Comment

See also that post.