Full title: Is the Orthogonality Thesis Defensible if We Assume Both Valence Realism and Open Individualism? https://qualiacomputing.com/2019/11/09/is-the-orthogonality-thesis-defensible-if-we-assume-both-valence-realism-and-open-individualism/ (a) An excerpt: The cleanest typology for metaphysics I can offer is: some theories focus on computations as the thing that’s ‘real’, the thing that ethically matters – we should pay attention to what the bits are doing. Others focus on physical states – we should pay attention to what the atoms are doing. I’m on team atoms, as I note here: > Against Functionalism.My suggested takeaway: an > open individualist who assumes computationalism is true (team bits) will have a hard time coordinating with an open individualist who assumes physicalism is true (team atoms) — they’re essentially running incompatible versions of OI and will compete for resources. As a first approximation, instead of > three theories of personal identity – Closed Individualism, Empty Individualism, Open Individualism – we’d have six. CI-bits, CI-atoms, EI-bits, EI-atoms, OI-bits, OI-atoms. > Whether the future is positive will be substantially determined by how widely and deeply we can build positive-sum moral trades between these six frames.
This argument also proves that quantum computers can’t offer useful speedups, because otherwise evolution would’ve found them.
This argument also proves that Genghis Khan couldn’t have happened, because intelligence and power converge on caring about positive valence for all beings.
I think the orthogonality thesis is in good shape, if these are the strongest arguments we could find against it in almost a decade.
Genghis KhanOpen individualism seems to either fail the monday tuesday test (if it was true on monday, false on tuesday, is there any experiment that would come up with different results?), or be blatantly false. Firstly, open idividualism is defined by Wikipedia as > Open individualism is the view in the philosophy of personal identity, according to which there exists only one numerically identical subject, who is everyone at all times.What sort of philosophical object might this be, Might it be a predictive model? Quantum mechanics predicts everything in principle, so this would make open individualism an approximation to quantum mechanics in the same way that the ideal gas law is. However, for us to gain confidence that it was correct, we would either need sufficiently many correct predictions that we had good evidence for it, or a mathematical derivation of it from other trusted principles. This blog uses it to predict that any sufficiently advanced AI will be friendly. This Blog predicts that agents that believe in open individualism will always cooperate in prisoners dilemmas. And that we could take Open Individualism to assert that > phenomenal reality is, in the most literal sense, one huge qualia-bundle, and although it seems like this qualia-bundle has partitions or boundaries, these apparent partitions are illusions. Phenomenal binding, on the other hand, is real— but on only the grandest scale; absolutely everything is bound together. Everything is ontologically unitary, in all important senses.With this quote implying that science would be harder if open individualism were true.
Comment
Hi Donald- author of opentheory.net here. Really appreciate the thoughtful comment. A few quick notes:
I definitely (and very strongly) do not "predict that agents that believe in open individualism will always cooperate in prisoners dilemmas"—as I said in the OP, "an open individualist who assumes computationalism is true (team bits) will have a hard time coordinating with an open individualist who assumes physicalism is true (team atoms) — they’re essentially running incompatible versions of OI and will compete for resources." I would say OI implies certain Schelling points, but I don’t think an agent that believes in OI has to always cooperate (largely due to the ambiguity in what a ‘belief’ may be- there’s a lot of wiggle-room here. Best to look at the implementation).
I think the overall purpose of discussing these definitions of personal identity is first, dissolving confusion (and perhaps seeing how tangled up the ‘Closed Individualism’ cluster is); second, trying to decipher Schelling points for each theory of identity. We only get predictions indirectly from this latter factor; mostly this is a definitional exercise.
Metaphysical claims like OI are typically argued on the basis of abduction, ie as a better explanation for existing data.
I say typically, because I am not sure that the claims in question work that way.