Safety regulators: A tool for mitigating technological risk

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bMmhR4epWEQ6prSZh/safety-regulators-a-tool-for-mitigating-technological-risk

Crossposted to the Effective Altruism Forum So far the idea of differential technological development has been discussed in a way that either (1) emphasizes ratios of progress rates, (2) ratios of remaining work, (3) maximizing or minimizing correlations (for example, minimizing the overlap between the capability to do harm and the desire to do so), (4) implementing safe tech before developing and implementing unsafe tech, and (5) the occasional niche analysis (possibly see also a complementary aside relating differential outcomes to growth rates in the long run). I haven’t seen much work talking about how various capabilities (a generalization of technology) may interact with each other in general in ways that prevent downside effects (though see also The Vulnerable World Hypothesis), and I wish to elaborate on this interaction type. As technology improves, our capacity to do both harm and good increases and each additional capacity unlocks new capacities that can be implemented. For example the invention of engines unlocked railroads, which in turn unlocked more efficient trade networks. However, the invention of engines also enabled the construction of mobile war vehicles. How, in an ideal world, could we implement capacities so we get the outcomes we want while creating minimal harm and risks in the process? What does implementing a capacity do? It enables us to change something. A normal progression is:

Comment

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bMmhR4epWEQ6prSZh/safety-regulators-a-tool-for-mitigating-technological-risk?commentId=XfDpQkh4LN363ohHD

How do you deal with the knowledge problem? Typically, the actual, experienced pain in steps 2 and 3 is critical to the safety measures implemented in 3 and enjoyed in 4. The progress is not delayed for all possible problems, but the worst of them get addressed—the incentive to be safe (reduce pain) aligns with the incentive to use the technology at all. This works for pain (risk that’s short-term enough to measure the cost and incidence of). It’s not clear that it works for rarer but more severe risks (x-risk or just giant economic risk).
In other words, the regulators are part of the technology in the first place—what’s the guarantee (or even the mechanism to start) that the regulators are addressing only the critical risks?

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bMmhR4epWEQ6prSZh/safety-regulators-a-tool-for-mitigating-technological-risk?commentId=4cx9HyEmkaghKngpR

How do you see the safety regulator model working in a case like bridges, where safety is already part of the primary function of the system, i.e. a bridge is built to optimize for getting people across a gap they couldn’t otherwise cross, and being better at being a bridge (getting more people across), means being safer (fewer people fail to make it across for deadly reasons)? It’s not entirely clear where we might draw the line to demarcate a safety regulator in such cases where safety is naturally part of the function.

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bMmhR4epWEQ6prSZh/safety-regulators-a-tool-for-mitigating-technological-risk?commentId=BvLFrBBrCM6kvDXH2

(though see also > The Vulnerable World Hypothesis), and wish to elaborate on this interaction type.What is the subject of ‘wish’?

Comment

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bMmhR4epWEQ6prSZh/safety-regulators-a-tool-for-mitigating-technological-risk?commentId=c3eojfELZMTMsN2os

Edited to add "I" immediately in front of "wish".